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References 46I. Introduction
The main point of this paper will be that West German unemployment
in the late 1980's has a curious double character: while its genesis is
largely determined by the macroeconomic events of the last two de-
cades - two stabilization crises and one wage revolution -, its current
state reveals strongly microeconomic features which call for micro
rather than macro policy measures.
To make our case, we proceed as follows. In section II of the paper,
we clear up our use of the terms 'macro' and 'micro' which may
diverge somewhat from the normal textbook wording. In section III,
we evaluate four major macro-paradigms of unemployment in West
Germany: the traditional Keynesian demand-gap and the neoclassical
wage-gap approach, the transatlantic crowding-out theory as recently
advanced by Fitoussi, Phelps (1988), and, at some length, the hy-
steresis-theory as pioneered by Blanchard, Summers (1986a, b, c;
1988). We shall argue that none of these paradigms provides a suf-
ficient explanation of the current persistence of unemployment in
Germany, but that some of them - notably the wage-gap and the
hysteresis-theory - contain most valuable elements; what they all lack
is a due account of the structural and institutional (i.e. the 'micro')
elements which are likely to cement an economy's macro inclination
towards hysteresis. In section IV, we try to fill this gap by post-
delivering a summary of these elements, with a focus on the structure
of long-term unemployment, regional disparities and structural change
between sectors of economic activity. In the final section V, we
briefly evaluate different employment policy options and, from our
own standpoint, make a policy choice.
This is an empirically oriented paper. As the questions we deal with
are very diverse in nature and spirit, we do not make an attempt to
provide a unifying formal framework; rather, we shall present a
mixture of casual empiricism and econometrics aimed at filling some
apparent gaps in the literature. Our case will be confined to (West)- 2 -
Germany, but similar arguments may apply - with proper qualifi-
cations - to some other large E. E. C. -countries.
II. HTftrminology
In this paper, we call something 'macro' if it concerns primarily the
economy as a whole, with no particular pattern (or 'structure') being
of any significance. As a complement, 'micro' simply means non-macro.
Note that the borderline between macro and micro is thus related to,
but not identical with the distinction between the demand and the
supply side. A Keynesian lack of aggregate demand is usually a macro
phenomenon. However, supply side deficiencies may belong to either
category: too high a level of unit labour costs is macro in our sense
while institutional rigidities and regulations are micro if they mostly
affect some subset of the economy. Hence, our distinction is a matter
of empirical judgement, not of precise theoretical classification.
III. Macro Theories of German Unemployment
1. Keynesian Demand Gap
When evaluating the (traditional) Keynesian view that a lack of aggre-
gate demand is the main explanation of German unemployment of the
1980's, one has to distinguish between two alternative meanings of the
term 'explanation'.
If explanation means a historical account of the emergence of unem-
ployment, then the Keynesian view has some appeal. Clearly, a new
dimension of unemployment was reached in the early eighties in the
course of a demand contraction which was the immediate result of
deliberate policy shifts of the German Bundesbank towards stabilizing
the price level and of the government towards consolidating public
finances, both political backlashes after the prior 'locomotive ex-- 3 -
periment' of concerted demand expansion in the late seventies. The
relevant macro statistics are broadly consistent with this view,
econometric evidence supports it. After all, this is not surprising:
the historical record shows that drastic upward shifts of the un-
employment rate usually occur via a stabilization crisis; in Germany,
this was so in 1923-24 and 1948-50 after currency reforms, but also
in 1974-75 and again in 1981-83. Apparently, the intertemporal co-
variance of sharp demand contractions and equally sharp increases of
unemployment is the statistically dominant force so that any
econometric attempt at assigning employment to 'causes' tends to
support a demand side hypothesis more than any supply side com-
petitor. Note, in this respect, that the most widely quoted econo-
metric accounting study (Bruno 1986) assigns at no time from 1974 to
1982 less than one half of German unemployment to aggregate demand
causes, despite the pronounced and by now generally recognized wage
pressure and the accompanying marked increase of unit labour costs
from 1969 to early 1975, and despite the locomotive experiment of the
late seventies which pushed the capacity utilization of the capital
stock to a peak not reached since 1973 and not reached again until
1988.
2
If 'explanation' means a genuine diagnosis of unemployment as it is
today, the traditional Keynesian view is not compatible with the facts
since the relevant economic indicators show that the German economy
does not suffer from a general demand slump which involves under-
employment of both capital and labour. By 1988/89, capacity uti-
lization in industry - how ever measured - has probably just sur-
passed the prior peak levels of 1979 and 1973, after six years
of steady - albeit moderate - real GDP-growth averaging about
See, e.g., Bruno (1986) who assigns 2/3 of German unemployment
of 1982 to aggregate demand (i. a. monetary and fiscal policy
variables) and only the rest to a wage gap measure.
2
Similar results for Germany have been obtained with different
econometric techniques i. a. by Layard, Nickell (1985); Layard,
Nickell, Jackman (1985); Franz, Konig (1986), and Gordon (1988).- 4 -
2. 5 % p. a. which lately accelerated to about 3. 5 % (1988). Whatever
slack of demand may have been present at the beginning of the long
upswing around 1982/83 or in the temporary slowdown of growth
around 1984/85, it has definitely disappeared since then. Note that
those econometric studies still pointing to an output gap in recent
years (notably Coen, Hickman, 1988; Gordon, 1988) use data up to
1984 only, a time when the cyclical indicators in Germany revealed a
slightly below average, not an extraordinarily high utilization of the
capital stock; by now, their diagnostic messages have simply become
obsolete.
In discarding a traditional Keynesian diagnosis, two caveats must be
kept in mind. First, by definition, the capital stock today is the
outcome of prior investments, and when the pace of capital ac-
cumulation slows down due to a demand induced recession as it did in
1981/82, the capital stock in later times will be lower and thus more
easily fully utilized than in the absence of the recession. This means
that, historically, Keynesian causes may have non-Keynesian con-
sequences; however, as the capital stock inherited from the past is
today a binding supply side constraint, this does not save the
Keynesian diagnosis from being wrong. It merely introduces an
element of path dependency which, of course, speaks for avoiding
recessions in the first place. Second, the comparatively low rates of
price and wage inflation in present-day Germany may provoke a
According to the quarterly industry poll of the Ifo-Institute,
Munich, which is usually regarded as the most reliable source for
this kind of data, capacity utilization in manufacturing reached
88.7 % in the fourth quarter of 1988, higher than the prior peak
levels of 1979 IV (85.5 %) and 1973 II (87.4 %) and only below the
'historical' high of 1970 I (92 %). On a yearly basis, capacity uti-
lization in 1988 (86.7 %) has been higher than in 1979 (84.7 %) and
about as high as in 1973 (87.1 %), but again below 1970 (91.0 %).
On basis of (less reliable) capital stock figures and extrapolations
of capital productivity, the Kiel Institute of World Economics and
some other institutions calculate economy-wide annual capacity uti-
lization indices. Defining the long-term high of 1970 as 100, the
Kiel Institute Index reached 98.4 in 1988, slightly below the level of
1979 (99.1) and 1973 (99.2). All forecasters agree that, in the
remaining three quarters of 1989, capacity utilization is likely to be
kept at least at the present level without any expansionary policy
measures.- 5 -
traditional Keynesian to argue that - given some wage and price
stickiness in the short run - there remains enough scope for ex-
ploiting a Phillips-curve trade-off between unemployment and demand
induced price inflation; hence German unemployment would still be
4
Keynesian in this sense. This argument mistakes the absolute level
of price and wage inflation as~ a better indicator for the state of the
business cycle than some measure of capacity utilization and output
growth. However, as the German (and other countries') historical
experience shows, business cycle peaks have at different times been
accompanied by vastly different levels of price inflation, depending on
the prior record of price (in-)stability which forms the basis for
economic agents' expectations. If anything, the acceleration of price
inflation may give a clue as to the state of the business cycle, and
this indicator does in fact signal some worsening of the price climate,
with virtual consumer price stability in 1986 being followed by in-
flation rates of 0. 5 % in 1987, 1.3 % in 1988 and, as most forecasters
predict, somewhere around 2.5-3 % in the current year. Hence,
despite its low level by international standards, German inflation
cannot be taken as evidence that the economy is still operating far
below its capacity limits, with additional labour being employable at
more or less constant marginal cost at a given capital stock. Yet,
with a fully utilized capital stock, price increases can only serve as
(non-anticipated) shocks to reduce the level of real wages so that, at
4
Usually, Keynesian calls for expansionary macro policies in Germany
are couched in terms of international coordination, with a view to
the notorious German trade and current account surplus (see, e.g.,
lately The Economist of Feb., 4, 1989, p. 65 "Still waiting for the
locomotive"). As far as these calls are simply meant as a case for
international charity in the sense that Germany should pull other
countries out of a slump (which, incidentally, is not visible), they
have nothing to do with unemployment in Germany and thus go
beyond the scope of this paper. As far as they are meant to make a
case for unemployment reduction in Germany itself, their validity
crucially depends on the elasticity of aggregate supply which is
dealt with in the text.
See, e.g., Commission of the European Community, European
Economy (November 1988), p. 161, with a forecast of 2.5 % and
Fels, Flemig, Langfeldt, Trapp (1988), p. 40, with a forecast of
3 % consumer price inflation for 1989 in Germany.- 6 -
its lower than average marginal product, additional labour will be
hired. Then, of course, the Phillips-curve strategy boils down to a
Keynesian cure for a neoclassical malady, namely a level of real wages
not compatible with full employment.
2. Neoclassical Wage Gap
In its macro form, the neoclassical diagnosis of German unemployment
states that the level of unit labour costs is too high for full em-
ployment to be achieved. The only straight way to test this hypo-
thesis comes down to comparing the current level of real unit labour
costs at a hypothetical state of full employment with a base level at
some time in the past when full employment of labour and capital
actually prevailed. The difference between these two levels - ex-
pressed as a share of the base level - is then called a wage gap.
Many serious technical difficulties are involved when calculating a
wage gap. In particular, some crucial parameters of the economy's
production technology must be estimated or imposed beforehand, and
the 'neoclassical' inverse variation of employment and labour pro-
ductivity has to be econometrically seperated from the 'Keynesian'
procyclical movements of productivity due to labour hoarding in
recessions and dishoarding in booms. As these technical details have
no bearing on our main argument, they do not need concern us
here.
Table 1 presents those two recent wage gap estimates for Germany
which come closest to supporting the macro version of the neoclassical
7
diagnosis. For the manufacturing sector, both Burda, Sachs (1987)
6 See Artus (1984), pp. 256 ff. , Bruno, Sachs (1985), pp. 179 ff.
and Paque (1989b), pp. 13 ff. for the relevant details.
7
Bruno (1986) obtains somewhat smaller wage gaps, Gordon (1988) no
positive wage gaps at all; however, Gordon's methodology has
serious shortcomings - above all the simple extrapolation of trend
productivity growth from the seventies into the eighties - which
make his estimates look quite suspect. For a critique of Gordon























Table 1 - Wage Gap Estimates for Germany (in %)
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985 1986 1987 1988
25.0 24.9
23.5 23.3 19.6
10.0 8.2 7.3 7.0* 6.0*
own estimate after completion of the study.
and Paque (1989b) obtain substantial wage gaps around 20 % in the
1980's, with only a very recent trend downwards. Note, however,
that nowadays manufacturing has a share of no more than 35 % of
total employment in Germany. An estimate for the economy as a whole
by Paque (1989b) indicates much lower gaps since the mid-seventies
peaking at around 10 % in the early eighties and then falling to levels
around 6-7 %. Also, intertemporal patterns are remarkable: while the
wage gap in manufacturing grew into a new dimension in the second
half of the seventies, it leveled off in the economy as a whole, with
only a modest increase of three percentage points from 1970-74 to
1980-84. Table 2 gives a clue to the structural forces behind this
picture: in the early seventies, both manufacturing and services were
hit by a hefty rise of nominal labour costs which was mainly due to
an increase of the wage level. Yet, all over the seventies, the service
sector could significantly improve its terms of trade relative to manu-
facturing, so that, by the middle of the decade, real unit labour
costs in services began to decline again while employment continued to
grow. Not so in manufacturing, where it took two recessions with a
net loss of almost two million jobs to achieve the required cost adjust-
ment by the mid' 1980's. Apparently, import competition from newly
industrialized countries finally squeezed the manufacturing sector
down to a competitive size with a better product mix to halt a further































Table 2 - Average Annual Growth Rate of Value Added Deflator,
Nominal and Real Unit Labour Cost in Germany (in %)















Source: Own calculations from National Accounts Statistics.
Given this distinct pattern of structural change between two major
sectors of the German economy, it would be misleading to infer from a
large manufacturing wage gap that the level of unit labour costs is on
g
average 'too high' in the economy as a whole. As the relatively small
wage gap for the total economy indicates, a good part of the manufac-
turing wage gap is likely to be due to intersectoral terms-of-trade
effects. By themselves, these effects raise an important issue of
intersectoral wage rigidity to which we turn in section IV of this
paper. Nevertheless, they speak against the simple neoclassical wage
level diagnosis.
To save the macro-version of the neoclassical approach from ob-
solescence, some non-Keynesian macro reason must be found why
about the same level of average unit labour cost means lower em-
ployment in the eighties than in the wage gap reference period,
8
This inference pervades much of the argument by Burda, Sachs
(1987)- 9 -
usually the late sixties. Just this is the core of the transatlantic
crowding-out hypothesis.
3. Transatlantic Crowding-out
Fitoussi, Phelps (1988) have advanced the theory that it was the
peculiar policy mix of the early Reaganomics which caused the
European - and thus also the German - unemployment malaise in the
eighties, despite the downward correction of real unit labour costs.
Briefly summarized, their argument runs as follows: after the tax
reform act of 1981, the sharp rise of the U. S. -budget deficit led to
an increase of real interest rates, a high current account deficit
and - temporarily - to a drastic appreciation of the U. S. -dollar. As
U.S.-firms were heavily favoured by the newly implemented tax cuts
and investment subsidies, they did not face a rise in capital costs
despite the increase of real interest rates. In Europe, however, high
real interest rates did raise capital costs while the appreciation of the
US-dollar reduced the pressure of competition; both effects pushed
firms into increasing their mark-up over unit labour cost. Hence,
despite the actual fall of real unit labour cost, employment contracted
or at least stagnated.
Whatever the merits of this reasoning as a theoretical account of some
macroeconomic disequilibria, it has fairly low diagnostic power for
present-day unemployment in Germany. This is so for three reasons.
Firstly, as an account of the sharp rise of unemployment in 1981-83,
the theory is a failure due to wrong timing: the U. S.-budget deficit
began its spectacular rise in 1982, a year when the business cycle
trough had already been reached in Germany. Also, real interest
rates - how ever measured - had made a great upward leap before,
from around 3 % in 1978-79 to about 4 1/2-6 % in 1982, depending on
which deflator is used and to what extent the movements of price
inflation are smoothed by intertemporal averaging (see Table 3). It is
very likely that, in these recession years, contractionary monetary
and fiscal policies in Germany and most other countries (including- 10 -





























































r = average yield to maturity of public authorities bonds with
terms of 3 years or more
p = annual increase of the private consumption deflator
p = annual increase of the value added deflator
v
*
p = centred moving (geometric) average of the rate of inflation
over three years
since 1979 the U. S. ) played by far the major part in the story.
Secondly, as to the persistence of unemployment in the recovery
period, only the early years 1983-85 show the relevant configuration
of macro variables (high US-budget and current account deficits,
high real interest rates and an 'overvalued' dollar). However, with
the exception of a brief dip of the business cycle in late 1984 and
early 1985, these were not depression years in Germany: on average,
real GDP grew at slightly above 2 % p. a., industrial production at 3 %
p. a. , gross fixed capital formation at 1.4 % p. a, with a notable
difference in growth rates between investment in durable equipment
(4.8 % p. a.) and investment in buildings (-0.8 % p. a. ). Of course,
this is no spectacular growth and - by placing a capital cost burden
on Europe - the American policy mix may well have contributed to the
9 See also Jackman (1988), p. 1248.- 11 -
slowness of the recovery at that time. Insofar, the theory makes a
valid point. Even then, however, the very different investment
balances of European countries - note the investment boom in
Denmark, the UK and Sweden - suggest that home made policy may
still have played a major role. Thirdly, in the period after the
dollar's fall and the gradual decline of real interest rates (see again
Table 3) , the growth of investment, output and employment ac-
celerated markedly (especially in 1988), but unemployment remained
stubbornly high, with a still growing share of long-term unemployed
and no prospect of substantial improvement in the near future, even
if the boom will continue at its present pace. Just these last years'
positive business cycle experience which Fitoussi, Phelps (1988) take
as indirect empirical support for their theory , casts serious doubt
on whether the transatlantic crowding-out hypothesis is really tar-
geted at explaining the core of the European malaise, namely high
unemployment even at the peak of a boom. It may be a valid supply
side theory of the European business cycles in the 1980's, but it is
not a genuine theory of unemployment persistence.
4. Hysteresis
The failure of the (traditional) Keynesian paradigm to explain the
European unemployment record in the 1980's has led Blanchard,
Summers (1986a) to formulate a theory of hysteresis which takes
explicit account of the asymmetry of this record. Briefly summarized,
Note that this period should be dated from mid-1985 until 1988,
despite the fact that the real interest rate, if measured by
subtracting consumer price inflation from the nominal interest rate,
did not come down until 1987. The sudden drop of consumer price
inflation below zero in 1986 was certainly regarded by economic
agents as a transistory phenomenon since it was all too obvious
that the dramatic oil price decline would not continue at the pace
it did at that time. Hence, for this late period, using the value
added deflator instead of an index of consumer prices may be more
appropriate for computing the real interest rate.
1
1 Fitoussi, Phelps (1988), Preface, p. VII f.- 12 -
the theory states that, after the long and severe recession of 1981-
83, a dual labour market has gradually developed with two kinds of
workers: those who remained employed all throughout or became
re-employed after some brief jobless spell, and those who - for what-
ever reason - remained unemployed. For the latter group, the
chances for re-employment have subsequently worsened for essentially
two reasons: (i) an effective devaluation of their human capital due
to the lack of job practice, demotivation and demoralization and the
potential employers' inclination to take the length of an unemployment
spell as a negative indicator for the expected productivity of a job
applicant; and (ii) the wage setting process where the interests of
(employed) insiders are much better represented than the interests of
(unemployed) outsiders. Thereby, the detrimental impact of the wage-
setting process is not or at least not primarily ascribed to centralized
wage bargaining between unions and employers' associations in cor-
poratist economies; it is rather booked on the account of employers'
rational inclination to pay efficiency wage premia which lead to a wage
12 level incompatible with full employment.
Does this theory stand up to the facts in the case of Germany? Two
straight empirical consequences of a process of hysteresis are that, in
the course of cyclical recovery, (i) the share of long-term in total
unemployment rises and (ii) the average duration of a completed
relative to an uncompleted spell of unemployment declines (due to the
adverse-selection effect of the 'good ones' leaving and the 'bad ones'
remaining in the pool of the unemployed). In fact, this is broadly
what happened in Germany: the share in total unemployment of those
who have been out of work for more than one (two) year(s) rose from
13.0 (3.9) % in 1981 over 24.9 (7.2) % in 1983 up to 31.9 (16.1) % in
1987 (end of September respectively); in addition, the average dura-
tion of a completed spell of unemployment relative to an uncompleted
one declined sharply, from 70 % in 1982 and still 68 % in 1984 down to
12
See i. a. Summers (1988).des Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft
- 13 -
12a 52 % in 1987. A similar process of hysteretic devaluation seems to
have taken place in the recovery years of the second half of the
seventies, with the share of long-term unemployment (uncompleted
spell over one year) increasing from low levels of about 5 % in 1971-
13 73 up to 14.5 % in 1979. Hence hysteresis seems to be not a new
phenomenon, but a general characteristic of extended recovery
periods.
As is well-known, the hysteresis theory has far-reaching macro-
economic implications for the inter temporal pattern of wage inflation:
whenever unemployment becomes hysteretic, recession-induced wage
moderation fades away because laid-off workers lose their market clout
as they grow into long-term unemployment. This has straightforward
consequences for econometric modelling: in traditional wage equations,
the growth of the wage level depends i. a. on the current unemploy-
ment rate as a proxy for the extent of disequilibrium (i.e. excess
supply) in the labour market. Implicit in this specification is the
assumption that the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment
(NAIRU) remains constant all throughout. The standard specification
implies that persistently high unemployment in fact leads to permanent
wage moderation. If the hysteresis theory is correct, the standard
wage equation is misspecified and should be replaced by a hysteretic
wage equation which includes some measure of the short-term devi-
ation of the unemployment rate from its long-term level, with this
Own calculations based on data of the German Bundesanstalt fur
Arbeit. Note that the expected duration of an uncompleted spell is
higher than the time of unemployment passed at the time of
inquiry. In a stationary state, with entries into and exits out of
unemployment being equal, this expected duration should be about
double the duration of the uncompleted spell. As, by 1987, the
labour market came close to a stationary state in this sense, the
average duration of a completed spell was about 26 % of the
average expected spell duration for a person who was unemployed
at the end of September 1987.
13
As the method of computing long-term unemployment has been
slightly changed in 1983 (for details, see Paque 1989b, p. 32,
footnote 30 and Werner 1987, pp. 41 f. ), the share given for
1971-73 is a (quite reliable) estimate of the author; the share for
1979 is an ex-post recomputation by the German Bundesanstalt fur
Arbeit.- 14 -
level gradually adjusting to changes of the current rate. In the
following, we specify a simple model along these lines for the German
economy. As we focus on hysteresis effects, we shall be very brief
on other aspects of specification and estimation.
Basically, our wage equation reads as follows:
(1) wt - 0o + j3x p£ + 02(P^ - p£) + 03 qfc + 04 In Ufc + 0,. In U*
*
with lower case letters denoting rates of change and upper case
letters levels of the respective variables. Equation (1) specifies the
rate of change of nominal wages in period t as a function of
- the rate of consumer price inflation (p.),
- the rate of change of the terms-of-trade, defined as the difference
between the rate of producer price (Value added') and consumer
price inflation (p. - p.),
- the growth rate of labour productivity (q,),
- the natural log of the current unemployment rate (In U,), and
- the natural log of some longer-term unemployment rate obtained as a
lagged moving average of U, over a number of periods.
/3 , /31, . . . , /3~ denote the coefficients to be estimated; e is a random
error term with the usual properties; the subscript t marks the
respective period t.
Equation (1) differs from traditional wage equations in two respects.
Firstly, it explicitly includes two 'bargaining variables', namely the
change of the terms-of-trade and labour productivity growth. This
seems justified for institutional reasons: While German wage bar-
gaining is organized on a regional branch level, it is de-facto syn-
chronized since some sectors (above all metal manufacturing) serve as
leaders in the wage setting process. Due to the extraordinary role
played by a whole battery of public agencies and economic research
14
A detailed account of the relevant specification issues is provided
by Coe (1985, 1988). In some respects, our model follows the
path traced out by Coe's empirical work.- 15 -
institutions who regularly publish evaluations and forecasts of the
business cycle and also of medium-term growth prospects, all major
figures on macroeconomic developments are well-known and carefully
observed by any negotiating party at the quasi-centralized bargaining
table. Hence, with due account to the comparatively short contract
duration (mostly one year) which has prevailed until recently , they
can be assumed to enter the strategic wage-setting game without much
delay. If the labour share in value added is taken as a distributional
target variable of the unions, one should expect that, apart from
consumer price inflation, both terms-of-trade gains and labour pro-
ductivity increases push up nominal wage demands since they are
constituent elements of the producers' profits. After all, there is a
long-standing controversy among German economists (including em-
ployers' and unions' representatives) about the so-called cost-neutral
wage policy which centres mainly around price inflation, terms-of-
trade gains (or losses) and labour productivity growth. Secondly,
we include a hysteresis-variable (In U ) which allows wage moderation
to gradually fade away after an increase of the unemployment rate,
even if this increase is not reversed in the course of the cyclical re-
covery. The rationale behind this specification is straightforward: if
there is no hysteresis, only U has an effect - a dampening one - on
wage inflation, i.e. 6, < o and /3S = o; if there is 'perfect' hyste-
resis, only U/U affects wage growth, with B, = -/3_ < o so that, as
* 4 3
soon as U approaches U a few periods after a recess ion-induced
upward shift of U, the dampening effect of unemployment on wage
inflation dissolves. Intermediate cases with partial hysteresis can be
imagined so that an unconstrained estimation of both j3. and /3- makes
sense as well.
Equation (1) was estimated with both annual and semi-annual data
from national accounts statistics, with the wage defined as total
15
With the sharp decline of price inflation in Germany, longer-term
contracts have reemerged in collective bargaining since the mid-
eighties.
See the seminal paper by Giersch (1967) who introduced the
relevant ideas.- 16 -
compensation per dependent employee, the consumer price as the
deflator of private consumption, the producer price as the deflator of
value added, and labour productivity as value added at constant
17 prices per employee. To account for a possibly lagged adjustment of
nominal wages to price inflation, terms-of-trade and productivity
changes, various different lag-structures were imposed in a number
of specification searches. As to consumer prices and the terms-of-
trade, the lags turned out to be very short, so that, with annual
data, an unlagged response of wages and, with semi-annual data, a
lagged response spread over just two periods by a moving-average
18 turned out to be appropriate. As to productivity growth, the lags
appeared to be somewhat longer: with annual data, a two-period
moving average, and, with semi-annual data, a second-degree poly-
nominal distributed lag over four periods performed best in por-
19 traying the adjustment process . As both consumer and producer
price inflation cannot be taken to be independent of contemporaneous
nominal wage changes, equation (1) was estimated by instrumental
Note that the wage thus defined includes social security con-
tributions of employees and employers. Using more narrow con-
cepts of the wage excluding these contributions did not sub-
stantially alter the results.
Ideally, both the wage and the productivity variable should be
measured per hour worked. However, as the statistics on hours
worked are unreliable and sometimes hard to interpret for semi-
annual data, we prefer using the definition in the text. All
estimates were also carried out with per-hour wage and produc-
tivity variables; the results came very close to the ones
presented in the text.
18
Ordinary least squares estimates of equation (1) with price expec-
tations explicitly modelled as ARIMA processes of different orders
produced slightly lower inflation coefficients than the ones
presented in the text, with the estimated equations in general
having a somewhat poorer fit; however, none of the major
empirical conclusions of this paper was affected by this change of
specification.
19
Note that - as supplementary estimates showed - nothing of sig-
nificance changes if some other lag structure with about the same
lag length is imposed.- 17 -
variable techniques, with lagged values of p and (p - p ) as well
20 as all other exogenous variables in the equation as instruments.
Table 4 and Table 5 present a selection of estimates of equation (1)
with different parametric restrictions and for different sample
periods. Note that, in all equations, a dummy variable (DY) was
added to the list of exogenous variables to account for the exceptional
nominal wage growth which took place in the early seventies and
which can hardly be explained by any of the other exogenous vari-
ables. With annual data, the dummy covers the years 1970-75, with
semi-annual data the semesters 1969 II to 1975 I,
Table 4, equation (la) shows the basic estimate for the whole sample
period with no terms-of-trade and no hysteresis effects on wage in-
flation allowed (/3» = 0; |3_ = 0). The coefficients of the productivity
and the unemployment variable have the expected sign and magnitude
21
as they can be found in other studies. However, the consumer in-
flation term turns out to be mostly insignificant and quite low, im-
plying a very modest degree of price indexation of nominal wages; in
turn, the dummy coefficient is highly significant thus indicating a
hefty wage push in the early seventies which remains unexplained by
22 the other included variables. Allowing for terms-of-trade effects
20
Theoretically, both the unemployment rate and productivity
growth are also endogenous to wage growth. However, many
empirical studies have shown (see e.g. Paqu6 1989b; Symons,
Layard 1984) that the main part of the employment response to
real wage shocks takes more time than just a year or even half a
year to realize so that endogeneity should not be a serious
problem; presumably, the same holds for the much disputed real
wage induced productivity growth. Estimates with either or both
of these variables ins trumentated by their own lagged values
showed the results to be very similar to the ones in the text.
2
1 See, e.g., Coe (1985, 1988).
22
Leaving out the dummy variable leads to a significant upward
shift of the inflation (and also the productivity) coefficient, but
also to very high autocorrelation of the residuals and a com-
paratively poor fit. Other studies of traditonal wage equations
and Phillips-curves for Germany apparently avoid the unpleasant
choice between an implausibly low inflation coefficient and a poorTable 4 - Estimated Coefficients of Traditional Wage Equations for Germany, Selected Periods
I. a) 1953-87, A
b) 1953-87, A
II. a) 1953-80, A
b) 1953-80, A
III. a) 1967-87, A
b) 1967-87, A
































































































































































+ t., vith 6, = B_ = 0 in equation a), B,. = 0 in equation Notes: Estimated equation: w = B
b). w = growth rate of nominal wage (defined as total compensation per dependent employee) in period t. p£ = growth rate of deflator of private
consumption expenditure in period t; for semi-annual data lagged moving average over two periods, p^ = growth rate of deflator of value added in
period t; for semi-annual data lagged moving average over two periods, q = growth rate of labour productivity (defined as value added at constant
prices per employee) in period t; for (i) annual data: lagged moving average over two periods; (ii) semi-annual data: second-order polynominal distri-
buted lag with endpoint-constraint over four periods (coefficient B. in the table shows sum of lag coefficients). U. = average unemployment rate in
period t; for semi-annual data seasonally adjusted. U. = average unemployment rate (i) for annual data: of the current and the last three years ; (ii)
for semi-annual data: for the current and the last six semester(s) (seasonally adjusted). DY = dummy variable (i) with annual data: for the years
1970-75; (ii) with semi-annual data: for the semesters 1969II-1975I. tt = random error term. R
J = adjusted R
2; DW = Durbin-Watson-Statistic; SEE =
standard error of the estimate; MDV = mean of dependent variable; n = number of observations; A = annual; SA = semi-annual; B , B., B., 8-, B^, 6^ =
coefficients estimated by instrumental-variables-technique with (i) for annual data: p£,. P°
instruments; (ii) for semi-annual data: p^_,, P^_,, P^Li' 'Pf-i ~
 pt-l'' *
pt-2 ~ P*-''' *
p
p? ,, p? „, p^ ,,












p? ~) p^ ,
t~J
), q,., lnU. and DY as instruments. * = coefficient
t L
not significantly different from zero at the 5 %-level. For semi-annual data, growth rates of respective variables are two-semester differences
natural logs. Data source: German National Accounts Statistics and Data of the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit.











































































































































































































Ri DW SEE HDV n
0.93 2.43 0.72 6.95 35
0.93 2.10 0.79 6.95 35
0.90 2.60 0.77 7.76 28
0.89 2.28 0.81 7.76 28
0.94 2.68 0.78 6.72 21
0.94 2.49 0.80 6.72 21
0.94 2.56 0.81 6.72 21
0.90 1.54' 1.09 6.73 42
0.89 1.49 1.14 6.73 42
0.90 1.56 1.04 6.73 42
Notes: Estimated equation: for a) and b): w. - BQ + B.p£ + B., q + B.lnlT + B_ lnU* + 6, DY + t^, with B^ = -B, in equations b), for c):


























e (defined as total compensation per dependent
employee) in period t. p = growth rate of deflator of private consumption expenditure in period t; for semi-annual data lagged moving average over
two periods. pt = growth rate of deflator of value added in period t; for semi-annual data lagged moving average over two periods, q. = growth rate of
labour productivity (defined as value added at constant prices per employee) in period t; for (i) annual data: lagged moving average over two periods;
(ii) semi-annual data: second-order polynominal distributed lag with endpoint-constraint over four periods; coefficient B, in the table shows sum of
lag coefficients. U = average unemployment rate in period t; for semi-annual data seasonally adjusted. U. = average unemployment rate (i) for annual
ditp: of the current and the last three years; (ii) for semi-annual data: for the current and the last six semester(s) (seasonally adjusted). DY =
dummy variable (i) with annual data: for the years 1970-75; (ii) with semi-annual data: for the semesters 1969II-1975I. t = random error term. IT
2 =
adjusted R
2; DH = Durbin-Watson-Statistic; SEE = Standard error of the estimate; MDV = mean of dependent variable; n = number of observations; A =
annual; SA = semi-annual; B , p., B,, B-, B., B,, B, = coefficients estimated by instrumental-variables-technique with (i) for annual data: Pt_i>























(p^ 3 - P[_3). Qt< lnUt, lnUt and DY as instruments; * = coefficient not significantly different from zero at the 5 %-level. For semi-annual data,
growth rates of respective variables are two-semester differences of natural logs. Data source: German National Accounts Statistics and Data of the
Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit.- 20 -
changes the picture considerably (equation Ib): the statistical quality
of the estimate is improved, and both the consumer price and the
terms-of-trade coefficients are now above 0. 5. Note that, in both of
these traditional wage equations, the dampening effect of a labour
market disequilibrium on wage growth is estimated to be fairly low, at
least at relatively high unemployment: e.g., an increase of the
unemployment rate from 4 to 8 % as it happened in Germany from 1980
to 1982/83 reduces wage inflation by just 1.11 % and 0.73 % p. a.
respectively. By and large, these results are confirmed by the
estimates for different samples as they are presented in the table,
namely excluding the 1980's (equations II), and including just the last
three major business cycles (equations III, IV with annual and semi-
annual data).
Table 5, equations (I) are two hysteretic modifications of the wage
equation (Ib) of Table 4. In equation (la), the coefficients of lnU and
lnU - with U being a lagged moving average of U over four periods
- have been estimated freely. As it turns out, both are highly
significant and similar in magnitude, but opposite in sign thus
pointing to some severe hysteretic inertia in wage adjustment. Im-
Footnote 22 continued
fit plus autocorrelation by introducing lagged endogenous
variables and/or by using standard procedures of autocorrelation
correction. To us, this looks much more ad hoc than allowing for
a general unexplained wage push in the early seventies which also
conforms to the widespread perception among economists that
union behaviour in Europe was exceptional at that time (see
Bruno, Sachs, 1985, Chpt. 11; Paque, 1989b). Coe (1985) in-
cludes a dummy variable just for the two semesters 1969II and
19701, Coe (1988) an additonal seasonal (!) dummy for 1971-1974;
both procedures also look quite arbitrary since they cut very
brief periods out of half a decade with an exceptional social
climate, with the dramatic events of the wildcat strikes in late
1969 and the famous aggressive bargaining round of 1974 being
just two episodes of a more general phenomenon. - Note that it is
very hard to test econometrically whether the wage push of the
early seventies was an exogenous event or whether it should be
attributed to an increased inflationary sensitivity: replacing the
level dummy by a slope dummy for the inflation coefficient yields
almost the same fit, with the wage push then fully accounted for
by a temporary upward shift of the inflation coefficient.- 21 -
posing the restriction /3. = -jSj. (equation Ib) supports this conclusion
since the 'perfect' hysteresis specification performs much better on
statistical grounds than the corresponding 'traditional' wage equation
in Table 4. Note that the absolute magnitude of the short-term
sensitivity of wage inflation with respect to changes in unemployment
is considerably higher than in Table 4, with a doubling of the
unemployment rate from 4 to 8 % now leading to a (temporary) wage
moderation of more than 2 % p. a. which gradually declines over time
and vanishes after four years. Also, the coefficients of both the
inflation and terms-of-trade variables are now much better identified
than before, with the inflation coefficient being above 0.7, thus
indicating a fair amount of price indexation of nominal wages. Leaving
the 1980's out of the sample (equations II) fully confirms this
pattern, with all coefficients preserving their prior magnitude. Hence,
again, the evidence points to hysteresis as a general phenomenon of
the German post-war-record, not as a peculiarity of the 1980's. The
results for the more recent period 1967-87 support our conclusions on
hysteresis all throughout, be it for annual (equation Ilia, b) or semi-
23 annual data (equation IVa, b).
From 1967 up to the present, grouped data on the duration of uncom-
pleted unemployment spells is available for Germany so that an ad -
ditional test of hysteresis can be carried out: if wage behaviour is
hysteretic, one would expect that short-term, but not long-term
unemployment has a significant negative effect on wage inflation. By
23
In general, the coefficients presented in Table 5 turned out to be
quite robust with respect to other changes in the sample period as
appropriate F-tests showed. Using other proxy variables for a
labour market disequilibrium (e.g. the vacancy rate, the level of
employment) or imposing a linear instead of a log-linear depen-
dence of wage inflation on the unemployment rate (i.e. substituting
lnU by U and lnU* by U*) lead to qualitatively similar results,
though in general at a worse statistical quality of the estimates.
The same holds for different lag lengths of the moving average
U*: both shortening and lengthening the lag preserves the hyste-
retic overall picture - at least within the bounds from two to six
years (i.e. four to twelve semesters) -, but the specifications with
a lag length of about three to four years perform best on statisti-
cal grounds.- 22 -
replacing our current and lagged unemployment variables by separate
rates for short- and long-term unemployment (called US, UL respec-
tively), the hysteresis test picture can thus be rounded off. The
borderline between short- and long-term unemployment was set at an
uncompleted spell of one year. Equations (IIIc) and (IVc) show the
results of the estimates with seperate unemployment rates: as ex-
pected, the short-term rate has a markedly negative, while the long-
term rate has - if at all - a moderate positive effect on wage in-
flation, an outcome which is again broadly in line with the hysteresis
. ... 24 hypothesis.
To summarize, our macroeconometric estimates are compatible with the
hysteresis-view of German unemployment since all major indicators
point to an increasingly dualized German labour market in the 1980's.
However, the question remains which economic forces are responsible
for the hysteretic macro picture.
No doubt, the most celebrated candidate in the literature has become
25 wage-setting in an insidei—/outsider framework. Attractive as this
candidate certainly is in view of the prominent role of collective bar-
gaining in Germany, it faces one major difficulty: by itself, i. e.
without any recourse to some kind of outsiders' human capital de-
valuation, it can hardly be made compatible with the observation of a
declining wage gap. If, e.g., a major demand contraction as in 1981-
82 eventually pushed about 3-4 % of the labour force into unemploy-
24
Drawing the borderline between short- and long-term unemployment
at uncompleted spells of three months, six months and two years
respectively did not reproduce the hysteretic picture to the same
extent as in the table. This indicates that a spell of one year may
be a reasonably good approximation for the qualitative shift from
active to passive labour market participation. This conjecture is
compatible with unemployment exit probabilities estimated by Budd,
Levine, Smith (1988) for the UK; as they show, the exit pro-
bability falls off sharply at a spell of just about one year.
25
See Blanchard, Summers (1986a), with strong reliance on the ideas
of Lindbeck, Snower (1986), and the contributions in Cross (1988)
which mostly focus on wage-setting.- 23 -
ment, and if - as actually happened in the 1980's - wage policy had
hysteretic features, but nevertheless allowed profit margins to re-
cover so that any sensible macro wage gap measure indicates about a
return to pre-recession levels of real unit labour cost, then it is
difficult to understand economically, why the outsiders' unchanged
human capital stock will not be gradually reemployed. Clearly, the
failure of the macro-version of the neoclassical labour cost theory
equally applies to a 'macro-version' of the insider-outsider theory.
Simply adding some efficiency wage considerations does not make the
case more convincing as a little thought experiment may indicate: if,
in the course of a recession, one of two workers with identical human
capital is laid off while the other one remains employed so that,
subsequently, the only difference between them consists in the very
fact of insider- versus outsider-status, then it overstretches economic
imagination to assume that, after cyclical recovery and the melting
away of any prior wage gap, a profit-maximizing firm employing the
insider would not recognize the outsider to match the insider in terms
of (potential) productivity and thus not profitably reemploy him. Even
more importantly, an efficiency-wage based insider-/outsider-theory
fails to contribute to the explanation of the most obvious and striking
international fact of labour markets in the 1980's, the difference in
performance between the United States and most EEC-countries, not
the least Germany: while the United States managed to cut down its
unemployment rate from almost 10 % in 1982 to just about 5 % most
recently, Germany achieved only a very modest reduction from 9.3 %
in 1983 to slightly above 8 % in 1988; likewise, the US-employment
growth rate in the recovery period surpassed 2.5 % p. a., the German
one was less than 1 % p. a. As there is no argument why efficiency
wage premia should suddenly play a much more prominent role in
Germany than in the United States - if anything, the high mobility of
the American work force coupled with a more dynamic cyclical upswing
west of the Atlantic speaks for the reverse to hold -, efficiency wage- 24 -
models should not serve as major ingredients of an explanation of the
26 current German malaise.
Hence, by negative selection, one is left with some not yet specified
non-macro reason as the key to the hysteretic German unemployment
record.
IV. Micro Forces behind Macro Hysteresis
In the following, we evaluate three major micro candidates which may
be responsible for the hysteretic macro appearance of unemployment
in Germany, namely human capital devaluation, regional imbalances
and - more generally - intersectoral structural change. Note that all
three are closely intertwined so that separating them is merely a
matter of expository convenience.
1. Human Capital Devaluation
Conceptually, two types of human capital devaluation may be distin-
guished: (i) an 'external' devaluation due to a decline of demand for
certain kinds of labour (including crude physical force) which is the
indirect result of structural change in the markets for goods and
services; and (ii) an 'internal' devaluation due to the lack of job
practice, demotivation and demoralization in the course of an unem-
ployment spell, in principle independent of structural change. The
theoretical contributions on hysteresis have so far mostly focused on
the second type; it has the unfortunate property of being empirically
very fuzzy since subjective categories like morals, motivation or the
'rusting' of skills are hardly quantifiable. The first type is somewhat
easier to grasp: If aggregate statistics reveal that long-term unem-
This does not mean that efficiency wage models are not an
important theoretical contribution to labour economics with a very
broad range of applicability (see Katz, 1986). It rather means
that, for the particular question at hand, their explanatory power
is very limited.- 25 -
ployment is concentrated among those unemployed with negative
structural characteristics like, e.g., lack of qualification, bad health,
old age or location in declining regions, then a good case can be
made for external devaluation dominating the picture. If, e.g., the
share of long-term in total unemployment is ceteris paribus much
higher in, say, the declining coal mining area C than in the fast
growing modern service region S, then it would be awkward to
ascribe this fact not to the difference of local economic conditions,
but to the endogenous deterioration of human capital in C compared to
S due to some local differential in skill rusting, morals or motivation.
Bluntly speaking, the former coal miner in C does not remain long-
term unemployed because he has recently become a bad coal miner,
but because (i) he is a coal miner at all or (ii) no jobs in other
sectors are on offer in region C. In case (i), his specific skill is not
demanded anymore; in case (ii), he finds no vacancy to match. In
either case, his human capital is devalued right from the start of his
unemployment spell, be it through skill rigidity or regional immobility.
Of course, this structural discrepancy will not be immediately re-
cognized as such by the collective bargaining parties in the labour
market so that, at first, wage moderation will prevail after a re-
cession. However, with cyclical recovery gaining ground, the struc-
tural core of the labour market disequilibrium will become visible to
unions and employers' associations so that a hysteretic macro pattern
of wage inflation will emerge.
A casual glance over some aggregate statistics shows that structural
factors like age, qualification and health play an important part for
long-term unemployment in Germany: in September 1987, 74. 1 % of all
long-term unemployed (with an uncompleted spell over one year) were
either aged above 55 and/or had an impaired health and/or no voca-
tional qualification; the corresponding share of short-term unem-
ployment of this group was 57.7 %. If the large group of unemployed
without vocational qualification is excluded - it alone comprises about
50 % of all unemployed -, these shares drop to 42.2 % and 21.6 %
respectively, i.e. more than 40 % of all long-term unemployed are
either quite old for a successful job search or in a relevant sense
'disabled'.- 26 -
German statistics allow a somewhat more complete empirical evaluation
of the importance of structural factors for long-term unemployment.
From the mid-1970's until today, an annual investigation at the end of
September breaks down the share of long-term in total unemployment
by different characteristics, namely by
- state labour offices (9 units),
- vocational qualification (2 units: qualified /unqualified),
- health standard (2 units: with/without impaired health or a physical
handicap),
- age (2 units: below/above 55 years), and
- sex (male/female).
With all cross classifications, this yields a yearly cross section of 144
observations. This grouped data set was used to estimate a logit-
model of the form
(2) In [pi/(l-pi)] = /3Q + 0^ + 02H± + P3Ai + ...
. . . + /34Q.H. + /3..Q.A. + PgH^ + 2 t . Dj± + c^
with p. being defined as the share of long-term unemployed (uncom-
pleted spell over one year) in total unemployment in the respective
group i, Q., H. and A. denoting dummy variables for unemployed with
no vocational qualification (Q.), with impaired health or a physical
handicap (H.) and with age above 55 years (A.) in group i; D.. ( j =
1, 2, . . . . , 7) denote dummy variables for the seven German state
labour offices Schles wig-Holstein/Hamburg (SL/H), Lower Saxony/
Bremen (LS/B), Northrhine-Westfalia (NW), Hesse (HS), Rhineland-
Palatine/Saar (RP/S), Northern Bavaria (NB), and Berlin (BL), with
the remaining two offices Baden-Wiirttemberg (BW) and Southern
Bavaria (SB) serving as the lower benchmark since they are the two
regions with the persistently smallest share of long-term unemployed;
e. denotes a random error term. 0 , J3.., ... /3fi and t. (j = 1, 2, ...,
7) are the coefficients to the estimated; thereby f5., /3_, 0,, are slope
dummy coefficients for 01? /3_, 0_. Appropriate tests with additional
slope dummies (e.g. for different state labour offices) showed that
relieving further restrictions was not required on statistical grounds.- 27 -
Economically, equation (2) states that, for an unemployed person at
the end of September in year t, the natural log of the odds of being
long-term unemployed depends on his particular set of structural
characteristics; thereby, with grouped data, the odds are approxi-
mated by the actual ratio of long- and short-term unemployment in
group i, and the structural characteristics are represented by cor-
27 responding dummy realizations for the group as a whole.
Table 6 presents ordinary least squares estimates of equation (2) for
the four years 1975, 1979, 1983 and 1987, for male and female unem-
ployed respectively. As the adjusted R' indicate, the structural
characteristics do quite well explain the cross-section variation of the
endogenous variable, especially for the latest year 1987. As to the
relative importance of the lack of vocational qualification (Q), an
impaired health (H) and age above 55 years (A), the message is
fairly unambiguous: all throughout H and A have a higher ex-
planatory power than Q; however, since 1983, the gap has somewhat
narrowed, with a lack of qualification now playing a more prominent
role than in the 1970's for both sexes. As to health and age, the
latter outperforms the former for women; the reverse holds for men
up to 1983, but not anymore in 1987. For both sexes, age gains quite
dramatically in importance in the course of the cyclical upswings from
1975 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1987. The signs of the slope dummy
coefficients reasonably complement the picture: they are negative for
BA and HA, because age and to some extent also bad health have by
themselves such a prominent influence on the probability of long-term
unemployment that, when applying together or with other charac-
teristics, any additional handicap has a much smaller marginal effect
than if it applies alone. This is not the case when H and Q apply
together since an unimpaired health is likely to be an asset for
27
As the endogenous variable in the equation is a proxy of the true
variable, the error term e also reflects the approximation error; as
this error declines with the number of units in group i, some
heteroskedasticity of e could be expected (see Pindyck, Rubinfeld,
1981, pp. 290 ff. ). However, as appropriate estimates showed, the
efficiency gain of using weighted instead of ordinary least squares
turned out to be negligible.Table 6 - Estimated Coefficients of Logit-Model (equation 2)
1975 1979 1983 1987



























































































































































































































































with subscript i denoting group i, p defined as the share of long-term unemployed (uncompleted spell over 1 year) in total unemployment of the re-
spective group, Q as a dummy variable for unemployed with no vocational qualification, H as a dummy variable for unemployed with impaired health or a
physical handicap, A as a dummy variable for unemployed with age above 55 years, QH as a dummy variable for those unemployed with both characteristics
Q and H, QA for those with both Q and A and HA for those with both H and A; D. are dummy variables for the German state labour offices Schleswig-
Holstein/Hamburg (D ; SL/H), Lower Saxony/Bremen (D,; LS/B), Northrhine-Westfalia (D3; NW), Hesse (D4; HS), Rhineland-Palatine/Saar (D&; RP/S),
Northern Bavaria (D,) and Berlin (D_); in the table, only coefficients and names of the three state labour offices with the highest dummy coefficients
are presented; c denotes a random error term. B , 6 , .... Bfi and . ( j = 1, 2, ..., 7) were estimated by ordinary least squares. R
2 = adjusted R*;
SEE = standard error of estimation; n = number of observations; standard estimation error of coefficients are given in brackets. • = coefficient not
significantly different from zero at the 5 %-level.- 29 -
compensating a lack of qualification. For both sexes, the development
of the three state dummy coefficients indicates an increasing impor-
tance of regional factors in the recovery periods 1975-79 and 1983-87,
at least relative to Q and H. Note that, in general, regional factors
which are closely linked to the geographical incidence of structural
change, play a more important role for men than for women; this is
not surprising, since men are likely to have their human capital more
specifically tied to some sectoral activity. Note also that the names of
the 'top states' indicate the regional factor to have become more
geographically concentrated: up to 1983, the southern labour office
Rhineland-Palatine/Saar was still among the leaders in long-term
unemployment due to the declining coal mining and steel industry in
the Saar Valley; since then, the states of the northern plains are left
28 alone at the top.
To broadly summarize, Table 6 points - comparatively speaking - to
- a modest, but somewhat increasing importance of qualification,
- a marked, but decreasing importance of health,
- an overwhelming and still increasing importance of age, and
- a marked and increasing importance of regional factors
as determinants of long-term unemployment.
Table 7 supplements this picture by presenting the fitted probabilities
(based on the estimates in table 6) of long-term unemployment for an
28
The same model was estimated for the remaining years 1976-78,
1980-82 and 1984-86. In general, these additional estimates sup-
ported all conclusions about intertemporal changes which are drawn
in the text on basis of the estimates in four—year-inter vails.
Note that the method of computing long-term unemployment has
been slightly changed in 1983. Before that time, very short
periods of employment (up to 13 weeks) were not counted as
terminating a spell of unemployment; from 1983 onwards, they are
counted as such (for details, see Paque 1989b, p. 32, footnote 30
and Werner 1987, pp. 41 f. ). Hence, for the years 1975 and 1979,
the overall level of p is biased upwards. As a parallel estimate for
1983 with p measured in the old and the new way showed, the
relative magnitude of the coefficients is virtually the same for both
methods of computing p; thus none of our major conclusions should
be much affected.- 30 -
Table 7 - Probability (in %) for an unemployed man to be long-term
unemployed (based on estimates of Table 6)
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Share of long-term in
total unemployment (men) 11.0 22.3 25.4 31.8
unemployed man at different configurations of his structural charac-
29 teristics. As to the cyclical pattern of long-term unemployment, the
table reveals some striking features:
(i) The 'base probability' - i.e. the probability of being long-term
unemployed despite the best possible structural characteristics -
made a jump from the cyclical peak of 1979 to the unemployment
trough of 1983, but hardly increased in the two recovery periods
1975-79 and 1983-87. Hence the rise of the share of long-term in
total unemployment from 11 % in 1975 to 22.3 % in 1979 and from
25.4 % in 1983 to 31.8 % in 1987 should be largely due to struc-
tural factors.
(ii) In the recovery period 1975-79, all structural characteristics
except qualification markedly increased their importance, with
'age' and 'region' having the lead. In the downswing 1979-83,
'qualification' and 'region' strongly gained ground while the
29
To keep the table lucid, only the case of male unemployed is
considered. However, the following conclusions by and large apply
to the case of female unemployed as well.- 31 -
power of 'health' and 'age' stagnated. In the recovery period
1983-87, 'age' has become by far the most important determinant
of long-term unemployment growth, followed by 'region'; in turn,
'qualification' and 'health' have lost clout.
On the whole, our results support the view that external rather than
internal forces are mostly responsible for human capital devaluation
and thus for labour market dualization in Germany. To explain why
age, bad health and lack of qualification have reduced the long-term
chances for reemployment, one does not need any recourse to a
powerful process of dequalification and demotivation during a jobless
spell. Rather, it is sufficient to assume that, given the high level of
dismissal protection German labour law and collective bargaining
agreements grant to any worker under normal business cycle condi-
tions , the cyclical downturns of 1974-75 and 1981-82 were taken by
firms as a chance to cut down their labour costs by laying off the
least productive workers. Right from the start as job seekers, those
laid-off workers with some 'structural handicap' (lack of qualification,
impaired health and, above all, age) were at a disadvantage since -
given the quite rigid structure of collective bargaining wages - there
is no chance for them to offer a compensatory wage cut for their
particular handicap. Hence, in the course of economic recovery, they
were left untouched as a sediment of long-term unemployment. Note
that, in this light, the human capital devaluation usually precedes the
state of unemployment; it is only temporarily concealed by favourite
cyclical conditions and the constraints imposed by the labour law
which prevents a continuous equilibrium type adjustment of the wage
31 and/or employment structure to the forces of structural change.
For a complete summary of dismissal protection in Germany, see
Soltwedel (1980), pp. 185 ff. In general, German labour law re-
quires that any dismissal must be 'socially justified', with by far
the most important case of justification being urgent business
requirements. Of course, this condition is most likely to be met in
times of recession.
3
1 On this matter, see Soltwedel (1988), pp. 190 ff.- 32 -
The changing relative importance of the three structural handicaps
lack of qualification, impaired health and age as determinants of long-
term unemployment fits nicely into the general pattern of structural
change of the German economy from a smokestack industrial to a
modern industrial and service economy. Apparently, age and lack of
qualification increase their importance since modern industrial and
service sectors require on average more sophisticated skills which
cannot be expected from the unqualified labour force, and a high
degree of flexibility which cannot be expected from older people.
Conversely, an impaired health loses some of its prior importance
which it had at the heyday of industrial society since, comparatively
speaking, the market value of crude physical force has declined.
The increasing importance of regional factors for the explanation of
long-term unemployment appears to be a direct reflection of the
regional incidence of economy-wide structural change: laid-off workers
in declining regions remain long-term unemployed either because their
skills are too specifically linked to the declining sectors or because
not enough job alternatives in other sectors are available in the
region. At least in the latter case, our evidence somewhat contradicts
the received wisdom in the modern macroeconomic literature that
regional imbalances are no important elements of the unemployment
32
malaise in Germany (and Europe in general). In the following, we
shall critically evaluate this view.
2. Interreg ional Imbalances
The received wisdom is mainly based on the so-called indices of
mismatch between unemployment and vacancies. Regional balance is
assumed to prevail whenever it is impossible to increase the rate of
job hirings and thus to reduce unemployment through interregional
movements of the unemployed. The rationale behind this definition has
See, e.g., Burda, Sachs (1987), Franz (1987c), Franz, Konig
(1986), Jackman et al. (1984), Jackman, Roper (1987), Layard et
al. (1985).- 33 -
some intuitive appeal: only to the extent that the particular
(mal-)distribution of unemployed and vacancies contributes to overall
employment, may it make sense to speak of unemployment caused by
an existing regional imbalance. Two major measures of mismatch are




where U. (V.) denotes the number of unemployed (vacancies) in
region i and U (V) the number of unemployed (vacancies) in the
economy as a whole. Economically, Ml can be interpreted as the share
of the total number of unemployed who would have to move between
regions to achieve regional balance, and M2 as the potential employ-
ment gain which could be achieved if regional balance was established
through this interregional movement. These measures have served
as the framework for the claim that regional unemployment has not
substantially increased in Germany in recent years.
The argument is usually based on cross-section data of the 142
German local labour officies: as can be seen in Table 8 (1), both Ml
and M2 have gradually increased since the mid-70s, with Ml moving
from 20.6 % (1973-77) up to 24.6 % (1983-87) and M2 from 3.5 %
(1973-77) to 4. 5 % (1983-87). This is not a negligible increase, but it
is a far cry from delivering a major explanation of the persistence of
unemployment. However, there is an important qualitative issue
hidden behind these numbers. If one explicitly distinguishes two
types of regional balance, namely the balance between selected large
units of the whole (e.g., state labour offices) and the balance within
these units (between local labour offices), a much more differentiated
picture emerges (Table 8 (2), (3)): between the states, there has
been a substantial increase of regional imbalance in the period, with
Ml rising from 11.7 % to 22. 1 % and M2 from 1.1 8 to 3.0S; in con-
trast, just the reverse holds within states, with all intra-state
measures Ml and M2 markedly declining in the period in question.
Consequently, the ratio of inter-state to total mismatch unemployment
rose quite dramatically from 56. 1 % to 89.8 % in terms of Ml and
For details, see Jackman, Roper (1987), pp. 11 ff. For a metho-
dological critique of the measures, see Paque (1989b), pp. 6 ff.- 34 -
Table 8 - Regional Mismatch Indices for Germany
Index M1(Z) Index M2(Z)
















































































Ml = 1/2 2 llT/U - Vi/V| ; M2 = 1 - 2 (U
Abbreviated names of state and state labour offices: SH/H = Schles-
wig-Holstein/Hamburg; S/B = Lower Saxony/Bremen; NW = Northrhine-
Westfalia; HS = Hesse; RP/S = Rhineland-Palatine/Saar; BW = Baden-
WUrttemberg; NB = Northern Bavaria; SB = Southern Bavaria.
from 30.5 % to 66.6 % in terms of M2. Hence, there has been a sig-
nificant qualitative shift of regional unemployment from a 'spot issue'
to a 'cluster issue': in the early seventies, regional imbalance was a
problem of many small backward areas more or less evenly scattered
all over the country while, by the mid-80s, it has become a problem
of many backward areas clustered in those regions where the de-
clining industries like coalmining, steel and shipbuilding tend to be
concentrated. Naturally, the same measured 'absolute amount' of
overall mismatch constitutes a much more severe obstacle to any
macroeconomic fight against unemployment when it is regionally
clustered since spill-over effects of regional growth centers cannot be
relied upon to accelerate economic development in backward areas. In
fact, the main structural issue which has gradually moved into the- 35 -
foreground of the policy debate during the seventies and eighties in
Germany, is not regional imbalance itself, but rather the broad north/
south divide which has completely pushed aside the questions of how
to support small backward areas (above all the 'Zonenrandgebiete').
Another tentative piece of empirical evidence for the causal link
between the rise and persistence of unemployment and the increase of
regional imbalances can be gained from separate estimates of
Beveridge- or U/V-curves for the German states. Underlying the
Beveridge-curve is the idea that, over the business cycle, there is a
stable negative relation between the number of unemployed and the
number of vacancies which can be approximated by some simple func-
34
tional form. Shifts of the Beveridge-curve themselves which may be
accounted for by a time trend must be interpreted as reflecting the
net effect of non-business cycle forces such as, e.g., a reduced
search intensity of the unemployed, greater choosiness of firms in
filling vacancies or simply a declining inclination to notify vacancies
at all. If these forces have no strong regional element, one should
expect all state Beveridge-curves to shift at about the same pace,
i. e. , with the same coefficient of the trend variable; if not, some
explanation in terms of regional imbalance must be looked for.
Table 9 presents the estimates of a Beveridge-curve of the form
(3) lnUt = /3Q + ^ lnVt + P2
 Tt
34
On the Beveridge curve, see Jackman, Roper (1987), pp. 25 ff.
Note that the last alternative is likely to be particularly relevant
in Germany since most labour market observers agree that the
notorious inefficiency of German labour offices makes firms refrain
from notification. Right now, the number of vacancies is estimated
to be around 600000 whereas less than 200000 are officially re-
gistered. If the inclination of firms to notify vacancies is ne-
gatively correlated with the regional unemployment rate due to the
comparatively poor quality of the unemployed in boom regions, the
mismatch measures will be biased downwards.- 36 -






























































































































Estimated Equation: lnU = /3 + 3, InV + )3 T + e , with U being
the average unemployment rate (in % plus 1), V being the average
vacancy rate (in Z plus 1) in year t and T being a trend variable
(trend coefficient in the table equals estimated coefficient times
100); all equations were estimated by instrumental variable
technique with correction for first-order autocorrelation of
residuals and p being the estimated autocorrelation coefficient
(instruments: InV , lnC, lnC , T, T , lnU , with C defined as
economy-wide degree of capacity utilization, computed by the
Institute of World Economics, Kiel), R* = adjusted Rz; SEE =
standard estimation error; T(74-87) = trend coefficient of se-
parate estimate for period 1974-87; standard estimation errors of
coefficients in parenthesis; (*) = coefficient not significantly
different from zero at the 5 Z-level.
Abbreviations:
BL = Berlin; SH/H = Schleswig-Holstein/Hamburg; LS/B = Lower
Saxony/Bremen; NW = Northrhine-Westfalia; HS = Hesse; RP/S =
Rhineland-Palatine/Saar; BW = Baden-WUrttemberg; NB = Northern
Bavaria; SB = Southern Bavaria.- 37 -
with U being the average unemployment rate (in % plus 1), V being
the average vacancy rate (in % plus 1) in year t and T being a trend
35 variable; equation (3) was estimated with instrumental variable
35a techniques for nine German state labour offices which - with minor
exceptions - come down to the German states. The results are
remarkable: the coefficients of the vacancy rate all have the expected
negative sign and fall into a fairly narrow range between -1.2 and
-1. 5; in contrast most trend coefficients are positive and differ widely
between states. Thereby, a clearcut north/ south divide emerges,
with the southern states having an insignificant trend shift in four
out of five cases, with the one exception being the state labour
district which includes the Saar, a region which suffers from the
same industrial decline as the Ruhr in Northrhine-Westfalia. On
average, the trend coefficient is much higher in the northern states.
This nicely reflects the relative performance in terms of employment
growth: a rank correlation between employment growth rates in the
period and the estimated trend coefficients of the equations turns out
negative and highly significant (around -0.8). The same holds for a
separate estimate of these curves for the period 1974-87 of which only
the trend coefficients are reprinted in the table. All this points to a
marked regional component explaining the differential shifts of the
36 Beveridge curves. Hence the great emphasis which some studies
Some specification search showed that a log-linear Beveridge-
curve performed best on statistical grounds for all state labour
offices; however, our main conclusions about the trend shifts
turned out to be very robust with respect to specification
changes. - As the vacancy and the unemployment rates are
extremely low for some states in some years of the sample period
(i.e. below 0.5 %), we added 1 all thoughout so that changes in
the lowest range do not recieve too much weight in the log-linear
specification. - To account for intertemporal shifts of the curve,
a simple linear trend was sufficient; quadratic and cubic trend
terms in appropriate specifications turned out mostly insignificant.
35a
For technical details, see notes to Table 9.
36
This result deviates sharply from the results of Jackman, Roper
(1987) for Britain (p. 31). As there are some differences in the
specification of the relevant equations, it is unclear whether this
really reflects genuine differences in development between
Germany and Britain or simply methodological peculiarities. In- 38 -
have put on global factors - above all, a not further explained de-
cline of search intensity - looks somewhat misplaced, at least for
the case of Germany. Instead, interregional differences of the employ-
ment performance may explain a good part of the curves' shifts.
To summarize, our results point to an increase of regional disparities
of unemployment during the last two decades in Germany. Of course,
this increase has been too creeping to account for sudden upward
shifts of unemployment. However, it may well help to explain a
significant part of unemployment persistence.
3. Structural Change between Sectors
There is a more fundamental sense in which current unemployment in
Germany may be called structural or 'micro'. It goes back to the
empirical argument in Section III that, since the mid-70s, the growth
of the wage gap has predominantly been a structural phenomenon,
with manufacturing - and not the modern service sector - bearing the
main share of the burden. The question then arises: can a
'structural' wage gap explain aggregate unemployment? After all, the
net loss of about two million jobs in the recessions 1974-75 and
1981-83 was almost exclusively due to the shrinkage of industrial
employment while the moderate employment gains in the recovery
periods 1975-80 and 1983-88 were mostly - though not exclusively -
made in service sector employment. A tentative answer to this
question lies in a comparison of the German case with a country
which experienced a rapid structural change between sectors without
Footnote 36 continued
general, the regional component of unemployment in Britain looks
much less dramatic in recent years than in Germany (Paque,
1989b, p. 9, Table 2), where unemployment rates in 1987 covered
a range from 5. 1 % in Baden-Wvirttemberg to 11.8 % in Lower
Saxony/Bremen.
3
7 See, e.g., Jackman et al. (1984), pp. 26 f.
37
a See Glyn, Rowthorn (1988), pp. 146 and Paque (1989b),
pp. 4 ff.- 39 -
persistent unemployment, the United States. Between 1970 and 1986,
American manufacturing employment stagnated, but private service
sector employment grew at an annual rate of 3. 4 % which amounts to a
net gain of 17.5 million service sector jobs, with the growth
proceeding at a fairly constant rate all throughout cyclical booms and
recessions. This employment success story had its counterpart in
terms of a marked increase of intersectoral wage dispersion between
manufacturing and services which also finds no parallel in Germany
where the dispersion remained roughly constant. As a consequence,
labour productivity growth slowed down much more dramatically in the
38
American than in the German service sector. Apparently, inter-
sectoral wage flexibility allowed a rapid expansion of employment in
the United States while intersectoral rigidity did not in Germany.
With the German manufacturing sector bound to shrink due to a high
wage gap and, on top of it, two sharp recessions, another sector was
due to take over the labour load. It did to some extent, with an
employment growth rate of about 2. 3 % p. a. in 1976-80 and 2. 8 % p. a.
in 1983-87. Clearly, this was not sufficient to cut back unemployment
as labour force growth speeded up due to a rising participation ratio.
Hence, without removing the structural wage gap in manufacturing
itself, a return to full employment could only happen in two different
ways: either the wage level in the service sector was reduced relative
to manufacturing so that low productivity laid-off workers could find
a service job, or the wage level was reduced altogether so that - at a
given relative wage distortion between manufacturing and services -
both sectors could expand. Thus, in the seventies and eighties
Germany had and still has two alternatives: either it imitates the
United States by allowing some more intersectoral wage flexibility to
give service sector employment an additional boost above its trend
38
Burda, Sachs (1987), p. 31, Table 13. Also, a good part of the
exceptionally bad overall productivity growth of the US-economy
and the dispropertionally large increase of low-wage employment
may be explained by this rapid^ structural change. See Bluestone,
Harrison (1988), Freeman (1988), and The Economist of Nov. 12,
1988, p. 86 f. "America's Shrinking Middle".- 40 -
growth, or it imitates its own past in the early sixties when the
relatively low wage level allowed structural change to proceed in a
39
state of overemployment. Both ways are probably not feasible as
corporatist resistance to them is too strong. Note that both ways
amount to a reduction of labour costs at least somewhere in the
economy to compensate for the employment effect of the wage gap in
manufacturing. Hence, if we are ready to assign explanatory power to
the vast difference of the experiences of the two countries in
question - and it would be hard not to do so - then a structural
wage gap combined with a rigid wage structure between sectors may
well explain at least part of the persistent unemployment in
~ 40
Germany.
V. Summary of Diagnosis and Policy Conclusions
Our main diagnostic points from the preceding two sections may be
summarized as follows:
1. The bulk of German unemployment arose in the course of the two
severe macroeconomic stabilization crises 1974-75 and 1981-83. At
its new dimension, the labour market disequilibrium subsequently
took on hysteretic macro features, i. e.
- nominal wage inflation resumed its normal path despite a per-
sistently high unemployment rate, and
- a dual labour market developed, with a growing share of long-
term unemployed.
2. The main reasons for the hysteretic macro picture lie in a com-
bination of microeconomic or structural factors:
(i) In the German economy with its extensive dismissal protection
for labour in normal times, there is likely to be a strong
3
9 See Paque (1988).
In essence, we share this conclusion with Burda, Sachs (1987);
however, they fail to stress the fact that the wage gap appears to
be structural, not aggregate.- 41 -
asymmetry between lay-offs and reemployment: Firms use
sharp cyclical downturns to purge their labour stock of the
least productive workers, but do not reemploy them as soon
as a 'fresh' (and prospectively more productive) labour
becomes available in the market as in fact happens when the
labour force grows. Hence a recession uncovers a human
capital devaluation which has already taken place on the job
due to e.g. age, impaired health or, to a lower extent, lack
of qualification, but which has to be tolerated by firms
under normal cyclical conditions because dismissal protection
impedes a more continuous adjustment and regeneration of
employment.
(ii) Measured properly, regional disparities in Germany have
grown since the mid-seventies so that, to an increasing
extent, long-term unemployment is not only the outcome of a
genuine devaluation of human capital, but also of a lack of
labour demand in regions with a particularly bad structural
mix of economic activity.
(iii) As the net loss of about two million jobs in the recessions
1974-75 and 1981-83 occurred in manufacturing where the
pressure of labour costs was particularly pronounced due
above all to unfavourable terms-of-trade effects, more jobs
were to be created in the service sector to prevent laid-off
industrial workers from growing into long-term unemploy-
ment. This happened, but - compared to the US-economy -
to a very modest degree mainly because intersectoral wage
rigidity did not allow low wage service sector employment to
grow as it did in the United States.
3. For diagnostic purposes, the standard explanation of hysteresis -
too high a wage level in an insider-outsider framework and human
capital devaluation in the course of an unemployment spell - are
only of secondary importance since
- estimates of aggregate, not of manufacturing wage gaps do not
support the view that the current wage level is much too high,
and- 42 -
- the incidence of long-term unemployment is so strongly related to
identifiable structural characteristics that it would be far-fetched
to place much explanatory weight on processes of endogenous
dequalification or demotivation.
Given this diagnosis, what can economic policy contribute to reducing
unemployment in Germany? As to microeconomic or structural policy,
there are at least three interesting policy options.
1. The apparently large differences in human capital values between
labour of different age groups, health status and qualification as
well as the pronounced regional component of unemployment call for
more wage differentiation. In the extreme, anybody with a struc-
tural handicap should be allowed to offer his labour at a wage
which is below, may be substantially below the standard wage as
fixed in collective bargaining agreements. Thus long-term unem-
ployed could compensate their inherent structural disadvantage by
individually offering favourable terms of trade to firms; declining
regions could attract capital by cutting labour costs and thus
compensating for other unfavourable local conditions.
Of course, there are counterarguments against this kind of policy:
(i) One may argue that efficiency wage considerations would
prevent firms from taking advantage of their potential for (down-
ward) wage differentiation. Prima facie, the experience of the
United States speaks against this argument. In any case, the only
way of testing its validity is by allowing all kinds of differentiation
in collective bargaining, and then see whether they have a chance
for survival in the labour market, (ii) One may argue that the
wages of many now long-term unemployed would fall below the level
of long-term unemployment aid which is paid indefinitely as a fixed
percentage (at least 56 % of the last net income in employment) so
that a classical poverty gap would emerge. Again, this may be
true, but it could only be tested in a market unconstrained by
collective bargaining standards. At any rate, it would clarify the- 43 -
costs in terms of 'voluntary unemployment' of a social system which
is anchored in past human capital valuation. In addition, some
minor reforms of the unemployment aid system such as the intro-
duction of a gradual phasing out of unemployment aid at certain
income threshold levels could help to alleviate the problem, (iii)
One may argue that introducing wage differentials which go sub-
41 stantially above the traditionally accepted extent will simply not
be acceptable to unions since this would come down to a virtual
dismantling of corporatist wage setting. This is no doubt true
since some sort of collective social peace guaranteed by corporatist
institutions enjoys high esteem in the German public. Hence, while
wage differentiation appears to be the most obvious and effective
instrument at hand, it may not be usable in the corporatist en-
vironment of Germany.
2. Theoretically, a labour market programme aimed at raising the
productivity of long-term unemployed may do the same job as a
wage cut for this group. As to unqualified labour, this may in fact
be so in practice although the casual evidence on qualification
initiatives is far from unambiguous. As to those unemployed of
advanced age or bad health (who alone make up about 40 % of all
long-term unemployed), the situation is more gloomy since their
structural handicap cannot be removed by more vocational training.
As to the regional factor, temporary programmes to support em-
ployment growth in depressed regions by, e.g., subsidizing capital
formation, make economic sense; however, experience shows that
these programmes have a tendency to degenerate into a channel for
permanent subsidization of senile industries without any significant
structural improvements. On the whole, targeted supply side
programmes of this kind cannot serve as more than supplementary
tools, not as core elements of a successful fight against unemploy-
ment.
There is disagreement about whether industrial wage differentiation
has increased, decreased or remained constant in recent years in
Germany (see Bell, Freeman 1985; Gundlach 1986; Soltwedel 1988).
In any case, the increase of differentiation - if it happened at all
- was very modest relative to the extent of structural imbalances.- 44 -
3. A third policy option would be a thorough deregulation of some
markets for goods and services to initiate a wave of productivity
gains. Favourite candidates could be some modern service sectors
such as communications, transport and insurance where expansion
in Germany lagged well behind other industrialized countries,
above all the United States. If such a productivity push is not
anticipated by collective bargaining, there may be a chance for a
reduction of unit labour costs in these sectors and a corresponding
surge of service employment. At its (admittedly Utopian) best, this
kind of development - initiated by the completion of the European
Common Market in 1992 - could parallel the miraculous German
growth of the 1950's when the fast integration of world markets for
industrial products allowed German manufacturing to expand rapid-
ly and thus to absorb the labour surplus due to the inflow of
42 refugees after World War II.
As to macro policy, one must make a clear distinction between supply
and demand side measures. Policies aimed at increasing the elasticity
of aggregate supply will help to alleviate the unemployment problem to
the extent that, through substitution effects, any increase of labour
demand for some parts of the labour force eventually triggers down to
the structurally disadvantaged groups. Clearly, this must be welcome.
The same holds for a general wage moderation and thus a general cut
in labour costs, if - again - the excess demand for labour in some
parts of the economy can be channelled through relative wage effects
(wage drift) into the disadvantaged parts. Whether this happens
does, of course, depend on the willingness of the unions to accept a
new surge of wage drift for some time, without a rapid adjustment of
the standard wage. The German experience of the early seventies
when excessive wage drift in 1968/69 contributed to the subsequent
wage revolution, makes one somewhat sceptical about this prospect.
As to monetary demand policy, it is hard to see what it should do in
the present boom period other than passively complementing any
4
2 See Paque (1987).- 45 -
prospective expansion of aggregate supply. Clearly, with high ca-
pacity utilization as it prevails, any deliberate monetary expansion to
increase employment would lead right into inflationary bottlenecks,
just as it did in the cyclical overheating at the end of the seventies
when the German economy took over the role of an international
demand locomotive. At that time, the unemployment rate could be cut
down by just one percentage point in a two-year expansion which
pushed up the inflation rate from 2. 8 % in 1978 to almost 6 % in 1980,
thus providing the rationale for the then following sharp contrac-
tionary monetary measures with all their far-reaching long-term
consequences.
As to fiscal demand policy, things look hardly different. Whatever the
long-term merits of income tax cuts may be as a supply side measure,
they are hardly needed to support an ongoing boom; if they had an
expansionary effect, it is now likely to foster price inflation, not real
income and employment growth. The same holds a fortiori for an in-
crease in public spending, even if it is on infrastructure investment.
There may be arguments for this kind of public investment to remove
bottlenecks on the supply side, although even these arguments are
weak for a country like Germany with its very good infrastructure;
however, it looks misplaced and ill-timed as a deliberate expansionary
demand policy.
To summarize, only micro policies can now help to alleviate the
German unemployment problem which, in the current macroeconomic
climate, has become a kind of singular monument of past macro-
economic failures. To be sure, nothing spectacular should be expected
from any move towards more structural differentiation and flexibility
as it has been advocated here. Such a move will only help to speed
up the reintegration of those parts of the unemployed who still have
at least some realistic chance of finding a job. Otherwise, we may
have to wait until the gigantic demographic shifts at the end of this
century finally 'solve' the problem by drastically cutting labour
supply, not by increasing labour demand.- 46 -
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